Is Indonesia utilising its international partners? The driving forces behind Forest Management Units

Muhammad Alif K. Sahide, Ahmad Maryudi, Supratman Supratman, Lukas Giessen

Abstract

International forest regimes have been influencing the development of Indonesia’s forest policy, and have complemented its domestic policy initiatives. Indonesian political entities utilise the regimes to pursue bureaucratic benefits and national interests. Forest Management Units (FMUs) comprise our heuristic model. We identified international and domestic actors and institutions that underlie the concept of FMUs and how FMUs are implemented along with the actors’ interests. We built our framework and propositions based on bureaucratic politics theory and the theorem on pathways of influence. We used observations, content analysis, and expert interviews to distinguish among actors and institutions, as well as various actors’ interests in FMU development. We found that the German government, via the German company Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), is the most powerful actor behind FMUs. International actors have dual motivations for supporting FMUs: (i) formally, they want to find the clearest, most efficient way to invest their international cooperation funds in tropical countries and to counter global deforestation; and (ii) informally, they want to counter the influence of Indonesian palm oil plantations. In addition, international interests could be contrary to domestic interests in terms of utilising FMUs. There is a strong, converging concern shared by international and domestic actors, whereby domestic actors use the formal goals of international regimes to pursue domestic interests. Domestic bureaucracies use FMU programmes to relocate power back to the central bureaucracies by preparing instruments that are formally in line with international regimes, but informal in that these instruments are dominated by domestic bureaucracies. For example, the instruments include reinforcing state forest areas, promoting forest benefits, centralising the budget, capacity building, and centralising information.

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1. Introduction

Forest Management Units (FMUs) – or Kesatuan Pengelolaan Hutan (KPHs) in the Bahasa Indonesia language – have been a core of Indonesia’s domestic forest policy. FMUs have been particularly designated as the main tools meant for reforming the domestic forestry sector. Indonesian forest law mandates that FMUs be implemented as a prerequisite for sustainable forest management (SFM). FMUs have received broad support from international donors since the 1990s (e.g. when international donors experimented with FMU production in the province of South Kalimantan). Implementing FMUs requires high political success on the part of politicians, the capacity and availability of institutions to overcome the problem of the hollow state, and a transparent government (Ostrom, 1999; Agrawal, 2007). In regard to managing forests and finding innovative approaches, a transparent government is especially important for carrying out projects of different global regimes at the domestic level. For example, both domestic and international actors have dealt with global regimes in relation to the Indonesian timber certification system, or the Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu (Nurrochmat et al., 2014; Maryudi, 2015). With a few exceptions such as McDermott et al. (2010), recent research has not widely examined the interactions between international forest regimes and domestic politics. Sahide et al. (2015) concluded that international regimes would only be relevant for Indonesia at a high level if domestic actors were politically engaged, even if the regimes did not align very well with domestic needs and problems.

1 The hollow state indicates a situation whereby a government fails to control forest management due to an unclear sense of tenure (relating to non-state/community actors’ claims to the land) and no clear ownership by various government entities over green zones (Ostrom, 1999; Agrawal, 2007).

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Domestic politicians often utilise international regimes to pursue domestic and bureaucratic interests. For example, the Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) declared that all international donors entering Indonesia should invest their money directly in FMU development, or indirectly guide their programme to the site of an FMU. Such a statement can be explained by looking at bureaucratic politics, which show that FMUs not only offer technocratic tools, but also contain many political instruments for actors to pursue domestic interests. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoFor) has designated 529 FMU units, or 50% of its target (until 2014); as of February 2015, 120 of them have been designated as FMU models; it is expected that this number will grow in the future (MoFor, 2015a).

This paper shows how international influences have become salient at the domestic level (Bernstein and Cashore, 2012) in Indonesia (Sahide et al., 2015). In addition, this paper examines the framework of the various pathways that international regimes infiltrate national context and influence domestic policy making setting (Bernstein and Cashore, 2012). This paper supports Cortell and Davis (2000) finding that international regimes became an explanatory variable for domestic politics. Using bureaucratic politics theory, this paper identifies domestic and global actors, in addition to their interests, and views these elements (actors and interests) as the driving forces underlying the concept of FMUs. Furthermore, this paper considers how FMUs are implemented in Indonesia.

2. Theoretical underpinnings

2.1. The theorem on pathways of influence

Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner, 1982). Such sets of principles, norms, and rules on a specific issue, such as SFM, are often codified in documents such as international treaties, conventions, or agreements, thus making them accessible for the purpose of analysis (Humphreys, 1999; Sahide and Giessen, 2015; Edwards and Giessen, 2014). International regimes enter the domestic arena through four pathways: (1) norms, (2) direct access, (3) rules, and (4) the market (Bernstein and Cashore, 2012). The traditional goal of international regimes is to influence domestic policies (Bernstein and Cashore, 2012; Sahide et al., 2015; Giessen et al., 2014; Wiersum and Elands, 2013). Bernstein and Cashore (2012) show that actors and the structures of problems (relating to society, politics, and forest issues) determine the forms that regimes take; they also describe how international regimes placed in a national context are different in each country. Global regimes depend on the structures of the aforementioned problems, actors, and the institutional setting.

Employing Bernstein and Cashore’s concept (2012), international regimes could potentially use the aforementioned four channels to infiltrate FMU political development (Fig. 1). In terms of the route for international norms, in order to highlight the issue of regimes at the domestic level, Cortel and Davis (2000) developed four mechanisms whereby domestic actors: (1) materialise their interests, (2) form domestic political institutions, (3) utilise social movements, and (4) build national campaigns that include political rhetoric.

2.2. Actor-centred analysis: the politics of bureaucratic power

When we describe actors as a driving force, we are referring to the actor-centred analysis of international and domestic actors as they influence FMU development in Indonesia. Bureaucracies have two central goals: (1) to provide public services using a problem-oriented approach, as stated in their mandates, and (2) to pursue the organisational interests of survival and expansion (Giessen et al., 2014; Giessen, 2011; Krott, 1990, 2005; Schusser et al., 2015). From the perspective of bureaucratic politics theory (Niskanen, 1971; Krott, 1990; Peters, 2010), it is logical for bureaucracies to impose their political agendas in opposition to other bureaucracies, especially with respect to who benefits the most from the formal structure and informal interests of FMUs.

To measure political influence at the international and domestic levels, we developed a framework in which political influence is a function of information and power (based on Simon, 1981; Krott, 1990, 2005; Aurenhammer, 2015; Prabowo et al., 2016). Political influence is the ability to form or implement an international regime’s forest issue elements (e.g. international norms of SFM for domestic FMU programmes) according to an individual’s or organisation’s interests.

2.2.1. Bureaucratic politics explains the institutionalisation of forest management as an instrument of state power

The post-colonial era led to Indonesia becoming a hollow state when the central government failed to properly handle forest management due to its unclear tenure (Ostrom, 2005; Agrawal, 2007). Therefore, the institutionalisation politics of forest management have been used as a technique of state power (Agrawal, 2001) also gives an example from India, not only to overcome this obstacle, but also to meet specific domestic interests. Institutionalising forest management is part of the territorial control process (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001) by which governments demarcate specific functions of forested land (e.g. conservation or production); in addition, governments mark areas of forested land as being claimed by the state, or potentially offered to private and indigenous actors, but still under state control. Non-state indigenous actors might be against institutionalising forest management if they wish to promote an indigenous concept that is purely established and free of any state structure (Bakker and Moniaga, 2010). This is in line with the theory of economics and forest tenure proposed by Peluso and Vandergeest (2001); they provided provisional access to state forests and their resources through government-issued permits that categorised their research under the themes of a state-managed system, privately managed concessions, and community forest use.

Using bureaucratic politics, we should understand the term societal clientele (Downs, 1967; Peters, 2010), as a bureaucratic opportunity for actors in the forestry and land use sectors to maintain some balance among state rule, policy domain, and coercive pressure from non-state actors in relation to FMU related issues, such as customary forest rights. Indigenous actors and NGOs, who are always strongly allied with international conservation regimes (Anaya, 2004), could reject the state’s FMU proposal to accommodate state scheme on community forestry (CF). However, most international forest regimes will also use the institutionalisation of domestic forests to infiltrate domestic policy by gaining direct access (Bernstein and Cashore, 2012). The global regimes will pursue their formalistic goals and informal interests; vice versa, domestic actors will utilise this instrument as a multi-functional tool for preparing direct access to inviting regimes (similar to McDermott et al., 2010).

2.3. Analytical framework: reconfiguring influence according to the actor’s interests and power

Valuable, very useful technocratic instruments that institutionalise forest management can potentially be a strong mechanism of bureaucratic power (see Section 2.2) to drive international actors toward...
implementing their mission. Therefore, ‘influence’ cannot be only seen as a monolithic route from the international to the domestic level, but also vice versa, in the sense that domestic bureaucracies could shape and underlie international regimes.

Consequently, we built our own analytical framework, by which we synthesised the theorem on the pathways of influence, and the politics of bureaucratic power theory. Within this context, we show that influence not only moves in the top-down direction of international to domestic policy, but also that domestic bureaucracies could use the official form of international regimes to pursue their informal interests. With this reconfigured framework (see Table 1), the results have four possibilities:

1. International actors and domestic bureaucracies face no political barriers, fulfil their mutual, formal goals, consider the interests of both sides, and influence domestic programmes.
2. International actors and domestic bureaucracies agree on the international actors’ formal goals, but domestic actors determine the interests of global actors by dominating national interests. Domestic bureaucracies could use regimes to pursue their official interests by developing tools that are formally in line with international regimes, but informal in that these tools are dominated by domestic bureaucracies.
3. Domestic bureaucracies shape and underlie international regimes’ formal missions.
4. Conflicting interests exist among (a) global actors, (b) international actors and domestic bureaucracies, (c) among domestic bureaucracies.

Rich technocratic instruments that institutionalise forest management in a situation involving the control of a ‘hollow forest’ are easily developed, and clearly linked to international forestry norms. Cortell and Davis (2000) shows that international norms can become an explanatory variable for domestic politics. With the support of technocratic, societal clients through consultancy programmes (Hamilton-Hart, 2006), states can easily adapt these norms into very standard, legal tools involving other global actors that support institutionalised forest management. Bureaucratic politics (Krott, 2005) views the institutionalisation of rich, technocratic forest management as a potential strength of state power in terms of new bureaucratic structures, which contain essential transferred budgets and mechanisms, as well as the capacity of staff to perform both qualitative and quantitative tasks, informational requirements, and general management. Consequently, diverse domestic uses of these forest institutions can be used to relocate power back to the central bureaucracies; for example, by centralising authority (Mutebi, 2004; Ribot et al., 2006) or budgets and information.

2.3.1. Propositions

- Proposition I. International actors have dual motives for supporting FMUs: (i) formally they want to find the clearest and most efficient way to invest their international cooperation funds in tropical countries and counter global deforestation; (ii) informally, they want to fight against the expansion of Indonesian palm oil plantations. In addition, global interests could be contrary to domestic ones in terms of utilising FMUs.

- Proposition II. Domestic bureaucracies use FMU programmes to relocate power back to the central bureaucracies by preparing instruments which are officially in line with international regimes, but informal in that they are controlled by domestic bureaucracies.

3. Methodology

This paper views the interests of both domestic and international actors as promoting the concept of FMUs in Indonesia. To shed light on how these actors and their interests drive the implementation of FMUs, we employed a number of approaches. First, we used direct observation. We are and have been directly and indirectly involved in carrying out FMU projects (which are funded by various global institutions); in addition, we have attended some public consultations on international and domestic projects. This is in line with Van Evera (1997), who maintains that observation is essential for collecting and verifying empirical data.

Secondly, to accompany the observations, from 2014 to 2015, we conducted expert interviews with staff members from different government entities that are related to FMU programmes. Annex 1 shows the list of interviews, which reflect our propositions and improved our judgement of the results from our observations (Mosley, 2013). Regarding FMU development in Indonesia, we performed a content analysis, as well as a literature review of official documents and news (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; Neuman, 2005). The content analysis is based on our expert interviews. We used the most relevant official documents, as well as text from trusted magazines (see Annex 1).

4. Results and discussion

4.1. International driving forces

In the following sections, we detail how global actors support FMUs in Indonesia and how this is in line with their interests.

4.1.1. The main international actors behind the concept of FMUs and their implementation

Indonesia’s forestry sector has been characterised by the influence of international actors, according to Sahide and Giessen (2015) and Maryudi et al. (2015). In light of Indonesia’s decision to reform its forestry sector, we identified four major global actors involved in initiating, developing, and implementing FMUs in the country: (1) the GIZ (previously the German Technical Cooperation Agency/GTZ), (2) the British Department for International Development (DFID), (3) the World Bank, and (4) the ADB (please see Table 2 for details).

GIZ is the strongest, most long-standing actor in terms of introducing FMU development in Indonesia. FMU development was off to a solid start in the early 2000s, and GIZ has been guiding FMU policies ever since in terms of discussions, the policy process, and consultations, as well as making the concept a reality by experimenting with models. The recent programme is called the Forest and Climate Change Programme (FORCLIME). MoFor is the lead agency in charge of executing FORCLIME, and has run it from 2009 to 2016. FMU concepts in Indonesia, especially on the island of Java, are replicated based on German models. This could be why Indonesia adopted FMU concepts with a ‘German’ mindset. Under the FORCLIME programme, several heads and managerial staff of FMUs have been dispatched to Germany to learn about its FMU system. FORCLIME is the most recent FMU programme, which was supported by GIZ, and involved key bureaucracies at the central and regional levels (especially at the district level). FORCLIME is the model for international actors that have consistently supported FMUs since the 1990s; these global actors have not only aided FMUs at the practical level. They have also advocated for FMU policies.

By studying the consistent efforts of GIZ, DFID has also become a pioneering global actor involved in policy and social interventions related to forest governance in Indonesia. DFID brought civil society into Indonesia’s forest policy process. DFID introduced formal, standard procedures such as how to share a learning partnership; facilitating cooperation between central and local governments (or spanning local and
Table 1
Reconfiguring the influences of global regimes based on actors’ interests and power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The influence of international actors on domestic bureaucracies</th>
<th>The influence of domestic bureaucracies on international regimes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Input:</strong> The dual mission of international actors</td>
<td><strong>Input:</strong> The dual mission of international actors</td>
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<td>Process: How national bureaucracies treat international mission in terms of dealing with power</td>
<td>Process: How international actors’ treat national missions in terms of dealing with power</td>
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<td>a. Formal goals</td>
<td>a. Formal goals</td>
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<td>b. Informal interests</td>
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<td>1. International regimes influence domestic formal programmes through actors</td>
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<td>2. Interests converge between international actors and domestic bureaucracies</td>
<td>2. Interests converge between international actors and domestic bureaucracies</td>
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<td>3. Domestic bureaucracies shape international regime</td>
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In MFP3’s formal document titled ‘Goals of MFP3’ we can easily see that the project aims to link the Indonesian timber certification system to FMUs and CF. In this context, MFP3 seems forced to accommodate or integrate the domestic interests of FMUs into their programme. We have noted ‘Goals of MFP3’ (especially Objective 3): ‘The activities of this work stream include: (1) Facilitating a series of coordination meetings on FMU and tenure issues; (2) Supporting the development of FMUs for issues related to community access to forest resources; (3) Drafting regulations on FMUs and Community Based Forest Management; (4) Facilitating the institutional formation of community groups into FMU partners; and (5) Facilitating stakeholder agreements on the standard procedures for participatory mapping and conflict resolution’. MFP3 integrates Indonesia’s Timber Legality Assurance System (which was the core, formal goal of MFP2) into FMU policies and development, especially concerning tenure issues (MFP, 2014).

ADB and the World Bank, which are both part of the CIF consortium for supporting FMUs in Indonesia, run projects via many of Indonesia’s central bureaucracies, and also involve them in managing it. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is the Indonesian government’s overall focal point for the CIF. MoF designated MoFor as the government’s focal agency for FIP through the office of its Secretary General. MoFor’s process of planning FIP goals and developing an investment plan, with support from multilateral development banks (MDBs), has gone through a series of steps involving multiple stakeholders. In addition, MoFor has consulted and coordinated with other relevant entities, such as Indonesia’s National REDD + Task Force, BAPPENAS, the National Council on Climate Change, and the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (Menko Perekonomian) (CIF, 2010). In the CIF’s formal document that lists the goals of FIP, we can see that FIP aims to link many global issues, such as REDD +, with the framework of implementing FMUs in Indonesia (CIF, 2010).

Finally, there are several logical reasons related to FMUs in terms of assisting global actors in handling technical instruments. The goal of using these instruments is to infiltrate facets of domestic policy making such as good forest governance, a pro-poor orientation, multiple purposes of forest production, and conflict governance (a similar work but in a different context is given by Burns and Giessen, 2015). Using this logic, global actors easily employ their international budget to support developing FMUs, rather than disbursing funds directly for regular domestic activities. Hence, this confirms a part of Proposition I: that international actors have formal motives for supporting FMUs, and that they want to find the clearest, most efficient way to invest their international cooperation funds in tropical countries and to counter global deforestation.

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*REDD + stands for the United Nations programme ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’.*

central governments); and supporting research institutions, civil society, and the private sector in regards to poverty and its relationship to SFM. In 2014, the DFID was selected to oversee the implementation of MFP3, the third phase of the DFID-supported Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP3). DFID began to establish the purpose of FMUs during MFP3, and will do so until 2017.

The other most recent and relevant international programme related to FMU development is the Forest Investment Programme (FIP), which is supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB). The FIP was founded in 2008 with support from the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) to help develop and execute government-led REDD+ projects in Indonesia, such as REDD+. In the CIF’s formal document that lists the goals of FIP, we can see that FIP aims to link the Indonesian timber certification system to FMUs and CF. In this context, MFP3 seems forced to accommodate or integrate the domestic interests of FMUs into their programme. We have noted ‘Goals of MFP3’ (especially Objective 3): ‘The activities of this work stream include: (1) Facilitating a series of coordination meetings on FMU and tenure issues; (2) Supporting the development of FMUs for issues related to community access to forest resources; (3) Drafting regulations on FMUs and Community Based Forest Management; (4) Facilitating the institutional formation of community groups into FMU partners; and (5) Facilitating stakeholder agreements on the standard procedures for participatory mapping and conflict resolution’. MFP3 integrates Indonesia’s Timber Legality Assurance System (which was the core, formal goal of MFP2) into FMU policies and development, especially concerning tenure issues (MFP, 2014).

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*REDD + stands for the United Nations programme ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’.*
4.1.3. Informal motives for engaging in FMU initiatives

4.1.3.1. Countering global deforestation or countering the expansion and influence of Indonesian palm oil plantations? The European Union (EU) – and especially Germany – is one of Indonesia’s main global partners in terms of international forest cooperation and fighting deforestation worldwide (Giessen and Sahide, unpublished). Global discourse has disparaged palm oil commodities as one of the major factors of deforestation and degradation, particularly in Indonesia (Sahide et al., 2016). In regard to the EU’s informal goals, EU countries have realised that palm oil is a big competitor with their own vegetable oils (especially rapeseed oil). In the global market, high competition over vegetable oil commodities arose when a large consumer goods company in the EU began to shift toward the raw material production of oil commodities.

As the biggest producer of palm oil in the world, Indonesia offers cheap, massive quantities that attract global buyers. This tends to shift the position of Western countries in terms of competing to be the producers of vegetable oil, especially in the search for new markets in India and China (Berita Satu, 2014). To block this trend, and also due to deforestation and health issues, the EU has launched campaigns to reduce palm oil imports. FMUs contain instruments to block deforestation, such as massively reducing palm oil production. International actors expect that FMUs can have the potential to not only generate income from SFM practises, but also to reduce deforestation resulting from palm oil expansion. By developing FMUs, illegal palm oil expansion will be effectively mitigated. In the meantime, FMUs can be introduced to develop other agricultural commodities that do not compete with palm oil.

4.1.3.2. Maintaining the dominance of international fund providers. The ADB does not want to lose Indonesia as a partner, which is listed as an emerging economic country that can pay back loans for ADB projects, including the FIP. At the Asia and Africa Summit, held in April 2015, Indonesia’s president argued that developing countries should no longer depend solely on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Rather, he asserted that Indonesia should engage with developing countries to find alternative global financial institutions on which to depend (Antara, 2015). Indonesia is now aligning with China to create a new financial entity: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The Indonesian government had to sign an Article of Agreement (AoA) that establishes this financial group (Stelindonesia News, 2015). This will pressure the ADB, World Bank, and IMF to more easily facilitate loans due to the new existence of a global competitor and fund provider; in addition, it will give Indonesia some leverage in terms of bargaining its interests to define the ideas underlying FMU projects (please see Section 4.2.1 to learn about the domestic actors’ interests).

4.1.4. Pathways used by international actors that influence FMUs

The discourse on the international norms of SFM and global direct access programmes significantly impacts FMUs. Through direct access and rules (Bernstein and Cashore, 2012), the World Bank and the IMF have a very big influence on the economic development resulting from Indonesia’s transformation policies and activities related to tropical forests (Sahide et al., 2015). During the Indonesian financial crisis of 1999, Indonesia received funds from the IMF and restructured its economy, including the forestry sector. During the timber boom of the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF were the most important global actors behind domestic projects (Sahide and Giessen, 2015). This is in line with Gourevitch’s (1978) finding that international market forces affect politics. Recently, Indonesia has witnessed massive deforestation, and conservation-oriented international regimes are now entering Indonesia via methods of international norms discourse such as SFM, which brought diverse regimes to the country. Table 2 displays the world actors and institutions that introduced SFM standards and discourse via FMUs.

The pathways of the market and international rules are no longer directly relevant to FMU issues. However, norms (as derived from Bernstein and Cashore, 2012) have become a more salient strategy in domestic politics because through direct access pathways, international actors make norms relevant. Technocratic consultancies (provided by international actors) adjusted SFM discourse to fit the Indonesian context via direct access pathways. In terms of technocratic consultancies, ideas such as state professionalism, decentralisation, a pro-poor orientation, transparency, and public participation drive the normative SFM discussions of FMU policy in Indonesia.

4.2. Domestic driving forces

Our finding that domestic bureaucracies used FMU-CF programmes to relocate power back to the central bureaucracies proves Proposition 1; the domestic bureaucracies did so by preparing instruments that were officially in line with international regimes, but which the domestic bureaucracies informally controlled. Table 3 summarises the general interests of the domestic bureaucracies that underlie FMUs, such as obtaining financial support, relocating power to the central...
bureaucracies, countering decentralisation, recentralising information and competencies, and recovering back state forest areas.

In the following sub-sections (from 4.2.1 until 4.2.7), Table 3 provides a detailed analysis of how the main domestic actors use FMUs to pursue their interests.

4.2.1. How FMUs attract international support: preparing direct access

The notion of FMUs is derived from technocratic expertise, which involves both national and international experts. Technocratic expertise altered Indonesia’s legal system of forestry governance, which consists of two parts: firstly, linking the international formal goal of the programme to the national regulatory complex system; secondly, producing intricate FMU instruments (such as mechanisms for regulations, budget incentives, information, and responsibility), which are very useful for international regimes. These tools were created by the regulatory powers of the many central bureaucracies involved. Table 4 shows how Indonesian bureaucracies form FMU policies to align with international regimes’ requirements for conducting their activities in Indonesia.

Table 4 shows that FMU instruments in Indonesia include high political will, institutional capacity, and innovative approaches to address the driving forces behind deforestation. Deforestation is a particularly important criterion for developing and implementing different international regimes that deal with diverse topics, especially REDD+. REDD+ aligns with the mission of FMUs, which are seeking more concrete instruments to fill many gaps in domestic implementation, such as a monitoring system, a benefit sharing mechanism, and other technical aspects at the domestic level (Kim et al., 2015; Brockhaus et al., 2012). Domestic actors invite international regimes to get involved with FMU issues by using the argument that FMUs align with the goals of REDD+.

Tables 4 and 5 present the details of international projects that successfully attracted direct and indirect support for FMUs. We observed issues such as CF, running small-scale forestry businesses, timber legality, and illegal logging; FMUs can cover all these topics. Climate change is the most consistent and attractive domestic matter supported by the multiple international actors mentioned in this paper.

Hence, domestic actors such as MoFor, the National Land Agency, BAPPENAS, Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform are the driving forces behind strong FMU development, which have successfully attracted diverse international regimes.

MoFor’s new structure is one of the central bureaucratic frameworks that strongly supports FMU development. MoFor created positions for 11 directorate generals (DGs), four of which are responsible for FMU development. At the lower level, four directorate institutions (which DGs run) were created, which are responsible for developing FMUs (Ford MoFor, 2015). Furthermore, domestic actors have successfully used FMUs to centralise all power back to MoFor, this is inline with Sahide et al. (2016). For example, BAPPENAS declared that ‘without’ FMUs, there would be no budget and launched a campaign with the slogan: ‘no FMUs, no aid’ (Setyarso, 2014). BAPPENAS has formally stated that all international donors that invest in Indonesia should directly place their money in FMU development, or indirectly situate their programme at an FMU site or planning area.

Indonesia attempted to negotiate with the ADB to influence the technical implementation of the FIP. The Indonesian government negotiated the strict interpretation of ADB guidelines, which did not align with Indonesia’s legal and domestic contexts. ADB did not want to pay for the FMUs because they are government organisations, which is contrary to ADB’s guidelines. In this case, consultants advocated for FMUs to get funding because the government had a limited budget; this happened because the FMU areas are very large and were still in the experimental stage. During this phase, FMUs did not have the capacity to be

Table 3
A summary of domestic actors’ interests that underlie FMU-CFs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Bureaucracies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparing direct access for international regimes; creating technocratic instruments</td>
<td>MoFor BAPPENAS, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of State Apparatus and Bureaucracy Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtaining international financial support and coalition partners</td>
<td>MoFor BAPPENAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensify forest utilisation</td>
<td>MoFor, regional governments Ministry of Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering decentralisation</td>
<td>MoFor Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovering state forest areas</td>
<td>MoFor, Provincial and district governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recentralising competencies</td>
<td>MoFor –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recentralising information and funds</td>
<td>MoFor –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4
The FMU instruments that domestic actors use to attract international regimes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors that create the instrument</th>
<th>Specific FMU instrument</th>
<th>The international regimes that used the instrument, and related actors</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
<td>2. Forest institution at the forest site</td>
<td>2. Biological diversity: Convention on Biological Diversity</td>
<td>2. Clear the process for checking and assessing the supply of timber in terms of the certification regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. BAPPENAS</td>
<td>4. The FMU institution is monitoring forest permits (community forest schemes and timber concessions)</td>
<td>4. Wetland management</td>
<td>4. Designate the state forest area as a restricted zone for palm oil plantations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. The administrative authorities is monitoring non-forest permits (mining concessions)</td>
<td>5. International tropical trade: the International Tropical Timber Organization</td>
<td>5. Forest permits are used to safeguard an area for some related regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Multiple possibilities for the state budget strategy from the central and regional governments (i.e. the provincial and district governments)</td>
<td>6. Illegal logging and timber certification: the Forest Stewardship Council,</td>
<td>6. Identifying illegal uses of state forest areas and forest resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. The Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification</td>
<td>7. State representative for conflict resolution, based on institutions in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Palm oil certification: the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil</td>
<td>8. State representative for developing agroforestry and CF in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Forestry research regime:</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); forest and environmental regime: ASEAN Senior Officials in Forestry</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11. International forum for sharing information on forestry regimes: the United Nations Forum on Forests</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
financially self-sustaining and to generate their own incomes. The consultants recommended that ADB provide funding for FMUs to implement the FIP. Thus, referring to Pielke (2007), we can say that the position of consultants in the FIP in relation to the ADB is that of an intermediary in the FIP. Thus, referring to Pielke (2007), we can say that the consultants recommended that ADB provide funding for FMUs to implement the FIP. Thus, referring to Pielke (2007), we can say that the position of consultants in the FIP in relation to the ADB is that of an intermediary in the FIP. Thus, referring to Pielke (2007), we can say that the consultants recommended that ADB provide funding for FMUs to implement the FIP. Thus, referring to Pielke (2007), we can say that the position of consultants in the FIP in relation to the ADB is that of an intermediary in the FIP.

One of MoFor’s key officials argued that Indonesia could reject ADB’s FIP that relates to FMUs (which is still in operation today) if it did not suit Indonesia’s priority system (which is part of the legal system). Indonesia’s firm attitude about overseeing the FMU project resulted from its increasingly strong economic position in terms of its gross domestic product (GDP).

4.2.2. MoFor reinforcing state forest areas

Under Indonesia’s land system, land is divided into two categories: state forest areas, and land outside forest areas. These zones fall under the jurisdiction of the state; in this case, provincial and district governments (Bakker and Moniaga, 2010), but their status is interpreted in diverse ways, especially concerning the legal definition of a ‘state forest area’ (Sahide and Giessen, 2015). Sixty per cent of all land in Indonesia consists of state forest areas administered by MoFor. Following the ‘big bang’ decentralisation at the end of the 1990s, regional governments were granted the authority to supervise production and protection of forests, including the power to issue forest management rights to private actors (Sahide et al., 2016). However, district governments do not have enough officers on staff, and a clear system of forest management is lacking, which leads to people treating state forest areas as public resources (Sahide et al., 2016). The overall impact of the district government’s fragmented, decentralised power has resulted in massive deforestation, which peaked around 2000 and 2001 (Sahide and Giessen, 2015).

Experimentation with FMUs is highly successful at the political level in terms of recovering control of state forest areas and filling the gap in ‘hollow’ state forest management. Following MoFor’s efforts to restore its authority and gain complete control of timber licences (Tacconi et al., 2004), a new law on regional governments (Law 23 of, 2014) was issued to reduce decentralisation by shifting authority away from district governments to provincial ones (please see the sub-section in this paper called ‘Central bureaucracies counter decentralisation’). Given this regulatory power, FMUs are now used to enhance MoFor’s position to recover state forest areas.

4.2.3. MoFor re-centralising the project budget

MoFor recently evaluated previous international FMU projects, particularly in terms of transferring the budgets of FMUs to the stages of implementation. GIZ programmes, such as FORCLIME, and DFID activities (such as policy advice and capacity building) are funded with grants from the BMZ or the British government. These grants are given directly to GIZ and DFID, and are not distributed to other partners (i.e. the BMZ and the British government). Thus, the grants are ‘part of the budget but off the treasury record’ (an anonymous respondent from GIZ, Interview 3, 2015). The grants are used for various purposes such as operational costs, staff expenses, consultancies, workshops, trainings, and publications. In addition, FORCLIME, which is run by MoFor, received a grant from the BMZ; this grant was integrated into MoFor’s budget and distributed to the forest district administrations in pilot districts.

MoFor agrees with the mechanism ‘part of the budget but off the treasury record’, and evaluates the transfer of a budget from its own offices to a district government’s budget. From MoFor’s perspective, it is ineffective to use the entire budget due to some complex problems with disbursing money via district bureaucracies. To avoid this challenge during the next round of project negotiations, especially for the FIP, MoFor asked the ADB for an FIP through which the money would not be transferred to the district government, but rather to related MoFor agencies in the central and regional governments.

MoFor now has more flexibility to advocate for the budget provided and to fully implement projects in the field. The budget transfer mechanism is replicated through MoFor’s financial control, which is based on the National Forest Rehabilitation Programme. This national programme is a MoFor agency that distributes budgets to various users such as the local government, consultants, and private actors.

4.2.4. MoFor’s capacity to centralise competences

GIZ actively works with MoFor’s Training Centre Agency to develop curricula for FMU capacity training programmes in selected national parks that focus on FMU production or conservation of forests (FORCLIME, 2015). In addition, GIZ is involved in enhancing the ability of MoFor’s Forestry Senior High School to manage FMUs (KPH Dephut, 2015). MoFor has allocated a budget to hire regular forestry students – as well as students studying for their bachelor’s degrees in forestry – as field staff for selected FMU models. Capacity building interventions and projects are useful for MoFor to demonstrate its control of FMU development programmes. With GIZ support, the Training Centre Agency has conducted several training activities related to FMU programmes at certain times and for specific purposes. MoFor officials often complain that local government staff train in FMUs, then suddenly shift to sectors not associated with FMU programmes. This indicates that FMUs have somehow not become a priority for local governments. Recently, MoFor developed a certification system (which is currently being tested.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Forest Carbon Initiative (IFCI, Australia)</td>
<td>Kalimantan Forest Climate Partnership (KFCP)</td>
<td>2007/08-2011/12</td>
<td>US$30 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Indonesian National Carbon Accounting System (INCAS)</td>
<td>2007/08-2011/12</td>
<td>US$2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR)</td>
<td>Improving governance, policy, and institutional arrangements for REDD+</td>
<td>2008-2011/12</td>
<td>US$1.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Norwegian government</td>
<td>Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)</td>
<td>2010-2016 (or longer)</td>
<td>US$1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Norwegian government</td>
<td>The UN REDD+ Programme</td>
<td>2010-2011 (phase 1)</td>
<td>US$5.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)</td>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>US$3.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU</td>
<td>REDD+</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>€6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFW Development Bank (Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, or BMZ)</td>
<td>Forest Programme (support for MoFor)</td>
<td>2010-2017</td>
<td>€27.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFW (Germany’s Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, or BMU)</td>
<td>Pilot Project: Ecosystem Restoration in the Harapan Rainforest</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>€10.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO)</td>
<td>Support from the presidential task force to oversee REDD+ activities, including coordination of related financial resources from international donors</td>
<td>July 2012-July 2014</td>
<td>US$900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in a pilot phase) through which people eligible to manage FMUs can become certified. This system would be mandatory for all FMU field staff. Thus, MoFor has strengthened its position as a hub of capacity building for all local governments that want to build FMUs in their jurisdictions.

4.2.5. MoFor and centralising information

Information is a very powerful tool that can propel and reduce the user’s biased interests (Krott, 2005; Wibowo and Giessen, 2015). MoFor controls key information about forests and FMUs such as state and non-state forest locations, changing the status of state forest areas to non-state forest areas, the baseline details of forest conditions, international projects in state forests, legal instruments to develop FMUs, and the availability of FMU experts. Not only can MoFor use this essential knowledge to manipulate users’ awareness of FMUs; it can also block the biased interests of local governments and private actors that are contrary to MoFor’s interests.

Different versions of the concept of FMUs and the diverse challenges of implementing them result from actors’ varied interests. To combat this problem, MoFor should manage information via strong bureaucracies, as well as events supported by a task force (whose members are appointed by MoFor). The national secretary of FMUs (Setnas, KPH) was a position created by MoFor (through MoFor decree sk.511/ Menhut-II/2012), and also supported by GIZ (MoFor, 2012; KPH Dephut, 2012). This position aids multiple actors in developing the notion of FMUs and monitoring their implementation; in addition, the national secretary acts as a liaison to provide information and technical assistance (MoFor, 2012).

4.2.6. Central bureaucracies counter decentralisation

Currently, there are at least two different ideas for making FMUs into institutions. These ideas involve declaring that a forest (under FMU supervision) exists for the purpose of (1) production or (2) protection (Sahide et al., 2016). The first proposal is that the staff of a specific FMU should learn to administer the ecological watershed area, based on the watershed approach. Provincial governments mostly use this strategy to establish FMUs in inter-district areas. The second idea is that the second type of FMU should employ the basic principle of forest management, which is that units should serve the administrative body at the specific forest site, thus reflecting the purpose of the forest (i.e. production or protection). District governments mostly use this argument to establish FMUs under their jurisdiction.

Law 23 of 2014, a new regional government law, mandates that the forestry sector be centralised to the authority of the provincial governments, based on the previous situation of decentralising district governments (Sahide et al., 2016). It is easier to handle the interests of 34 provincial governments, rather than a very broad range of interests from more than 500 district and municipal governments. The new situation has legal support (Law 23 of 2014) in that provincial governments represent the central government in regional areas. Following the huge amount of deforestation that has resulted from uncontrolled permits for plantations issued by the district government, MoFor has brought some forest regulations back to the provincial and central governments (Tacconi et al., 2004; Bae et al., 2014). This is an ideal moment for MoFor to campaign and establish FMUs as tools for recentralising and countering a complex situation of forestry decentralisation (Sahide et al., 2016). This is in line with Ribot et al. (2006) and Mutebi (2004), who showed that decentralisation policies could be a strategy for recentralisation. However, the circumstances for implementing Law 23 of 2014 (which relates to decentralisation) are challenging because the fiscal balance law (which provides the legal basis for fiscal decentralisation) is currently being revised in the national parliament. Thus, the central and local governments are now facing a problematic scenario for carrying out the new decentralisation policy. They have to follow Law 23 of 2014 on Local Government. However, they should also follow existing fiscal balance Law 33 of 2004, which refers to the old decentralisation, Law 32 of 2004.

Essentially, these recentralisation efforts face two challenges from district governments that want to continue to administer forest areas (Sahide et al., 2016). Those two challenges are: (1) administering state forest areas, and (2) administering non-state forest areas. Furthermore, indigenous actors launched a campaign slogan: ‘no rights, no FMUs’ to counter the massive goal of FMUs to re-affirm the legal status of state forests. This means that MoFor has to guarantee indigenous people’s rights before implementing FMUs (Sahide et al., 2016).

4.2.7. Central bureaucracies promote forest benefits: countering conservation

In a context where conservation is a big concern for international regimes, global timber certification and other conservation-oriented regimes are now the chief global actors influencing domestic policies, such as making timber certification mandatory in Indonesia (Wibowo et al., unpublished). The concept of FMUs could be used to facilitate conservation-oriented regimes with international interests, as well as domestic, production-oriented regimes. For example, under the MFP3 project, FMUs could potentially link up with global and domestic timber certification regimes. Worldwide norms on SFM could be adopted by experimenting with FMUs; SFM is now causing a famous slogan to spread within Indonesia: ‘sustainable forests equal people’s welfare’. Since the forestry sector is now shaping a legal mandate within a framework of green investment, MoFor is trying to not only conserve forest areas, but also to generate income from them.

International actors will be actively engaged in developing a road map for revitalising Indonesia’s forestry industry until 2020. MoFor and BAPPENAS conducted a study involving the global actors, which they synthesised to develop recommendations for creating a policy on the country’s forestry industry (Justianto and Sukmananto, 2005). These actors and their activities included: (1) ITTO’s project: ‘Strategies for the Development of Sustainable Wood-based Industries in Indonesia’; (2) ‘An Analysis of Future Forest Scenarios’ which is a partnership among the United States Agency for International Development, the organisation Natural Resource Management, and DFID’s MFP; and (3) ‘Generating Economic Growth, Rural Livelihoods, and Environmental Benefits’, which is supported by CIFOR and the World Bank. In the study’s conclusion, MoFor and BAPPENAS recommended that efforts be made to connect the forestry industry with SFM programmes (which include FMU development), and to overcome illegal logging activities. Hence, these results indicate that FMU development is one of MoFor’s strategies.

In terms of FMU conservation, current experiments are happening whereby national parks are re-named as FMU conservation forests; the status quo of the central government overseeing national park management continues. This shows that MoFor has very much served FMU production and protection forests, rather than FMU conservation forests. In order to counter the legal premise that conservation areas are the most restricted zones for community activities, many international actors have established their projects in national parks (i.e. FMU conservation forests).

5. Conclusion

‘Influence’ cannot be viewed solely as a ‘goal’, but should rather be seen as a way or ‘intermediate objective’ for achieving the particular interests or strengthening the power of specific actors. Therefore, we built our own analytical framework – which synthesised the theorem on the pathways of influence – and the bureaucratic politics theory to show that influence cannot only move in a top-down direction, from international to domestic policy (see Bernstein and Cashore, 2012). Rather, domestic bureaucracies could also utilise the official form of international regimes to pursue their informal interests. Our empirical finding – that domestic bureaucracies could utilise regimes to pursue their bureaucratic interests by preparing instruments which are formally in line
with international regimes, but are informally dominated by domestic bureaucracies – has proven Proposition II. We have also identified three areas that contain potential conflicts of interest, such as: (1) between international and domestic actors in terms of countering deforestation, or promoting forest benefits (which confirms a part of Proposition I); (2) global actors who are imposing their internal agendas; and 3) among domestic bureaucracies, specifically the central, provincial, and district governments in terms of using FMUs for decentralisation policies or recentralisation strategies (Sahide et al., 2016). The other assumption (there are four assumptions, please see Table 1) presents an interesting possibility for future research, especially in terms of how domestic actors shape international regimes.

Our empirical results confirm Proposition I, which is that FMUs have a dual function. Furthermore, international actors have dual motives for supporting FMUs: (i) formally, they want to find the clearest, most efficient way to invest their international cooperation funds in tropical countries and counter global deforestation; and (ii) informally, they want to counter the expansion and influence of Indonesian palm oil plantations. We have also proven Proposition II, which is that domestic bureaucracies use FMU programmes to relocate power back to the central bureaucracies by preparing instruments that are formally in line with international regimes, but are informally dominated by domestic bureaucracies.

We found that the German government is the most powerful actor behind FMUs. Germany impacts FMUs via the German company GIZ, which specialises in international development. Notions of FMUs in Indonesia, especially on the island of Java, are simulated based on German models. This could be why Indonesia came to develop a German mindset in relation to FMU development. DFID, the World Bank, and the ADB have followed in the footsteps of previous actors in terms of directly implementing FMUs.

International actors materialise domestic actors’ interests, and socialise political forces through domestic regulatory power. Meanwhile, BAPPENAS, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of State Aparatus aligned with MoFor to make FMU programmes a national interest. The results show that all components of power (coercion; incentives and disincentives; and controlled, dominant information) have been successfully recentralised back to MoFor by experimenting with the concept of FMUs and their implementation, via programmes supported by global actors. MoFor successfully utilised FMUs to recover state forest areas, and to centralise information and the budget mechanism. MoFor used decentralised FMU policies for recentralisation, to promote forest benefits or to counter conservation, and to centralise capacity building and competencies.

Multiple central bureaucracies support FMUs, which have become a national interest. FMU development contains a high amount of political success that has caused international actors and institutions to want to link their programmes with FMUs. MoFor actively promotes sustainable and economic use of forests, as opposed to conservation instruments, which are often seen via their ‘technical’ characteristics. This means that an instrument solves a political problem at best. For example, consider climate change, a problem for which economic instruments such as taxes or tradable permits are seen as being technically better than regulatory tools.

FMU instruments have shown a strong tendency toward political success. FMUs are not only utilised due to their technical abilities, but also to reflect certain political interests. Many instruments are not introduced due to their ‘technical’ features with regard to problem solving. Indonesia used a regulatory instrument (which is better in this context than another tool, such as a tax or economic instrument); this reflects the government’s political interests more clearly.

Acknowledgment

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Annex 1 List of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Interview 1, 2015</th>
<th>The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) consultant (1) for the Forest Investment Programme (FIP) in Indonesia on 1 June 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview 2, 2015</td>
<td>The ADB’s consultant (2) for the FIP in Indonesia on 2 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview 3, 2015</td>
<td>Staff from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ) for the Forest and Climate Change Programme (FORCLIME) in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview 4, 2015</td>
<td>Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP) staff for the MFP3 (i.e. MFP in its third phase) project in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview 5, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with MoFor staff on FMU development in Indonesia (1) on 2 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview 6, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with MoFor staff on FMU development in Indonesia (2) on 2 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview 7, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with the Regional Director of Management and Areal Preparation on MoFor’s use of forest areas, 7 May 2015 (via electronic messages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview 8, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with the praeisdium of the National Forestry Council and the FMU Consultant on 20, 22, &amp; 24 April 2015 (via electronic messages)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Interview 9, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with the South Sulawesi Provincial Government Officer, who was also the secretary of the FMU establishment team from 2008 to 2010 (via electronic messages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview 10, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with the leader of the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN) in 2014 (direct interview) and 2015 (via electronic messages)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interview 11, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with the secretary of the forest agency of South Sulawesi Province</td>
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<td>Interview 12, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with the officer of the forest agency of the Bantaeng District Government</td>
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<td>Interview 13, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with MoFor’s National Secretary of FMU Implementation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interview 14, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with the National Secretary of the Indonesian Communication Forum on Community Forestry (FKKM), which is involved in facilitating the development of Lebak Customary Forest</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Interview 15, 2015</td>
<td>Interview with the staff of Balang Sulsel, which is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) in South Sulawesi Province, and acts as the field facilitator to manage Kajang Customary Forest, with support from the Center for International Forestry Research (CFOR) in Bulukumba District, 15 May 2015 (via electronic messages)</td>
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</table>

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